Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition by André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis Miguel
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions
Permit Markets with Oligopoly
Competition
Francisco J. Andre´ and Luis Miguel de Castro
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
1. February 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67812/
MPRA Paper No. 67812, posted 19. November 2015 17:43 UTC
 1
 
 
Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with 
Oligopoly Competition1 
 
Francisco J. André2   and   Luis M. de Castro. 
 
Dept. of Economic Analysis. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Campus de  
Somosaguas, 28223 Madrid, SPAIN. 
November 2015 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prior research has shown, firstly, that firms subjected to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy 
scarcity rents and, secondly, that they can manipulate the price of permits as a rent 
seeking behaviour. We analyse these issues using a duopoly model under Cournot and 
Stackelberg competition. We identify the different sources of scarcity rents and 
determine under which conditions they can generate incentives for the firms to lobby the 
permit price up. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, Stackelberg competition 
eliminates incentives to collude if ther is no grandfathering. However, such incentives 
appear if there is an initial free allocation of permits, which is a policy argument against 
grandfathering. This effect is increasing with the amount of permits allocated to the 
leader and those parameter changes that undermine the leader’s advantage in output 
production or reduce the leader’s abatement cost. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the creation of scarcity rents for oligopolistic firms by an 
emission trading system. We model the mechanisms that give rise to scarcity rents and 
identify the circumstances under which such rents can be large enough to offset the costs 
to comply with the environmental policy. 
The initial historical experiences of emission trading took place at regional and 
national levels. The US SO2 trading system, under the framework of the Acid Rain 
Program, is widely recognised as the main pioneering application for its ambition and 
significant influence (see e.g. Stavins, 1998). This policy approach is also becoming 
increasingly important at an international level as a way of dealing with transboundary 
environmental problems, among which climate change is nowadays seen as the most 
salient one. It gave a reason for the creation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and since then its relevance within 
the policy agenda has steadily increased. 
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol introduced emission trading as one of the flexibility 
mechanisms to be used by the Annex I Parties in meeting their emission limitation 
commitments. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was launched, 
to a large extent, as a means to meet the Kyoto commitments. It became the first large 
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the world, and remains the biggest. It is a 
major pillar of EU climate policy and it covers all 28 EU member states plus Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein. See Newell et al. (2013) for an overview of the major carbon 
markets in the world. 
It is well established in the literature that some environmental policies can create 
scarcity rents for firms, which in the case of climate policies are sometimes known as 
climate rents. This effect is clearly visible in most cap-and-trade (CAP) schemes, 
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including the US SO2 market and the EU ETS. Due to the tradable nature of emission 
permits, some firms can take the opportunity to obtain additional revenue by selling 
permits, which is sometimes known as windfall profits. Empirical evidence suggests that 
this phenomenon has been rather important in the first phase of the EU ETS. A less 
obvious effect comes from the role of permits as an input. If permits become more scarce 
(and hence, more expensive), this will represent a higher cost for firms, which will react 
by producing less output and rising its price. This induced effect can alleviate or even 
more than fully compensate the compliance costs, resulting in higher profits. 
We examine the existence of scarcity rents for oligopolistic firms that are subject 
to a CAP system. Specifically, we ask if and how firms can benefit from the fact that the 
permits become scarcer. We set up a duopoly model in which each firm is initially 
endowed with a number of free permits and can purchase additional ones (or sell its 
surplus) in the market. In the output market we allow for Cournot or Stackelberg 
competition. 
 In the Cournot version, we show that a higher permit price increases the firms’ 
cost of purchasing permits, but it also has two positive effects on profits: first, it restricts 
output and increases the output price as well as firms' revenues (which we call "output 
scarcity rent") and, second, it increases the value of the firms' holding of permits (which 
we label as "grandfathering scarcity rent"). The share of the output scarcity rents that 
accrues to a specific firm depends on the elasticity of its rival's output with respect to the 
permit price, which implies that a monopoly can never obtain output scarcity rents as we 
define them. 
In a Stackelberg setting with a leader and a follower, the qualitative conclusions 
are similar, although the calculation of the output scarcity rents are not the same for both 
firms due to their different market shares, which creates a gap between the effect that a 
higher permit price has on their profits. 
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We subsequently proceed to explore a particular case with a separable cost 
function to gain more accurate insights. As a first core finding we conclude that both 
firms face a profit function that is convex in the permit price, which implies that, when 
the price is sufficiently low, both firms will benefit from a price reduction, whereas with 
sufficiently high prices, they will benefit from further increases. Apart from these two 
regions, in the Stackelberg model there is an additional intermediate interval in which 
both firms' interests are decoupled because the leader's profit is decreasing while the 
follower's is increasing. 
As a policy application of our results, we ask about the possibility that the firms 
could collude somehow to inflate the price of permits as a rent-seeking activity. We 
conclude that this type of behaviour is more likely to show up when firms compete on an 
equal footing, as in the Cournot setting, whereas the existence of leaders and followers 
tend to undermine the chances for collusion. 
We pay special attention to the role of grandfathering as an allocation mechanism 
and conclude that it makes the firms more likely to benefit from a permit price increase 
and hence to engage in collusive agreements. Actually, if the number of permits 
distributed by grandfathering is large enough, it could even be the case that the firms are 
always willing to push the price up, whatever the starting point. In the Stackelberg case 
there is a qualitatively stronger implication that leads us to conclude that, in the absence 
of grandfathering, there is no room for collusion because the collusive region shrinks to 
such an extent that it may disappear. Therefore, in a Stackelberg setting, the mere 
existence of grandfathering has the qualitative implication of opening up the way for 
collusion. This result represents an important argument against grandfathering insofar as 
it can introduce incentives to foster collusive manipulation. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we allow for parameter asymmetries. In the Stackelberg 
case, we conclude that the incentives for collusion are sensitive to the allocation of free 
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permits received by the leader, but not by the follower. Moreover, those parameter 
changes that tend to undermine the leader’s advantage in the output market (an increase 
in the leader’s output cost or a decrease in the follower’s) make the firms more 
symmetric in a certain sense and increase the likelihood of collusive behaviour. The 
opposite occurs with abatement costs: the likelihood of collusive behaviour tends to 
decrease with the leader’s abatement cost and increase with the follower’s. 
The closest papers to ours in the literature are those dealing, on the one hand, with 
scarcity rents and, on the other hand, with permit price manipulation. For a broad 
discussion on scarcity rents, see e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf (2001). In a perfect 
competition framework, Mohr and Saha (2008) claim that, via the generation of scarcity 
rents, a stricter environmental regulation might have a distributional impact in the sense 
of increasing firm's profits and passing the cost onto consumers. André et al. (2009) 
make a similar point in a strategic setting with quality competition. MacKenzie & 
Ohndorf (2012) claim that both revenue-raising instruments (RRIs) such as emission 
taxes or auctioned tradable permits, and non-revenue-raising instruments (NRRIs), e.g. 
freely allocated tradable permits, can create scarcity rents that may be susceptible to 
costly appropriation activities. Kalkuhl & Brecha (2013) analyse the impact on the 
overall scarcity rents of mitigation targets and find that reducing fossil resource use could 
actually increase scarcity rents and benefit fossil resource owners under a permit 
grandfathering rule. 
In the specific case of emission permits trading, Newell et al. (2013) point out 
that the power generators extracted rents by receiving carbon allowances for free and 
then passing on the opportunity costs of these allowances to their customers. Moreover, 
some firms have taken the opportunity to sell a part of their permit allocation and get 
extra revenue, which is commonly referred to as windfall profits. For an analysis of this 
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phenomenon, see e.g. Sijm et al. (2006), Ellerman and Joskow (2008) or Ellerman et al. 
(2010). 
Moving on to price manipulation, it can be noted that, since the seminal paper by 
Hahn (1984), some authors have explored the possibility that a dominant firm can exert 
its market power by manipulating the permit price. See, among others, Misiolek and 
Elder (1987), Von der Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis (1997, 2004). Hintermann (2011, 
2015) concludes that the largest European electricity producers might have found it 
profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards, which can partially explain the 
elevated allowance price level during the first 18 months of the EU ETS.   
Unlike most papers in the related literature, we consider an oligopoly market 
structure instead of a dominant firm and a competitive fringe. Thus, our setting is more 
consistent with collusive agreements between firms rather than dominant position abuse 
by a single firm. Moreover, instead of studying the distortion of competition on (product 
or permit) markets caused by price-setting firms on the allowance market, we focus on 
the output market and do not explicitly model the permit market, but simply study how 
the permit price affects the firms’ results. In this sense, our paper is closer to Ehrhart et 
al. (2008), who show that under some conditions firms can benefit from a higher price of 
permits. They also claim that in the EU ETS there are loopholes in the trading law that 
allow for collusive behaviour among firms to manipulate the price of permits.3  
In contrast to Ehrhart et al. (2008), we consider grandfathering, which allows us 
to make an explicit characterisation of the different sources of scarcity rents. Moreover, 
we compare Cournot vs. Stackelberg settings, while their analysis is restricted to 
situations in which the firms play exactly the same role in the market. We are not aware 
                                                 
3 These include, first, the possibility to influence the initial allocation of permits (to make it more 
stringent), second, the ‘opt-in’ rule, which enables outside firms to participate in the system, third, the 
implementation of project-based mechanisms paying more for these credits than they would in the market 
and fourth, paying additional emissions duties. 
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of any paper in the related literature that compares Cournot and Stackelberg settings. 
Another difference is our detailed study of a particular case, which renders some insights 
that cannot be derived in a general model, such as the fact that incentives for collusion 
could totally disappear under Stackelberg competition. 
Section 2 presents the basic model. A particular abatement cost function is 
considered in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the interpretation of our results in terms of 
incentives for price manipulation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The general model 
Let us consider a simple duopoly model of a polluting industry that is subject to a 
tradable permit system. We assume that the firms compete in the output market and, once 
their output levels, 1x  and 2x , are determined, they simultaneously choose their cost-
minimising emission levels, 1e  and 2e . 
The cost function of firm   1,  2i  ,  ,i i iC x e , depends on output ( ix ) and 
emissions ( ie ) and is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments with the 
following properties: 
2 2
20 ,     0 ,     0 ,     0.
i i i i
i i i i i
C C C C
x e e x e
               (1) 
 This function integrates production and abatement costs and reflects the fact that 
producing clean (with low emissions) is more costly than producing dirty. Each unit of 
emissions must be covered by an emission permit. Initially, each firm i  is endowed with 
a given amount of free permits iS , and additionally required permits, i ie S , can be 
obtained on the market at an exogenously given price, p . Considering the cost of permit 
purchasing, the total cost of firm i  is given by 
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     , : ,i i i i i i i iTC x e C x e p e S   .    (2) 
 To find a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the model is solved by backward 
induction. In the final stage, both firms decide on their emission levels to minimise their 
total cost,  ,i i iTC x e , while taking their output levels and the price of permits as given. 
If the solution is interior, we obtain the standard first-order condition (FOC), 
0i
i
C p
e
   ,      (3)  
which implicitly defines each firm’s demand for permits,  * ,i ie x p .4 Using this demand 
function in (2) we obtain the minimised total cost function of each firm in terms of its 
output and the price of permits: 
         * * * *, : , , , , ,
i i i i i i i i i i i
TC x p TC x e x p C x e x p p e x p S        (4)  
and using the envelope theorem we know that 
*
*  
i
i i
TC
e S
p
,     (5) 
which simply states that the marginal impact of an increase of the permit price on total 
cost equals the amount of purchased permits. 
Now we move on to the first stage of the game, the output market, in which both 
firms face the inverse demand function  P X , where 1 2:X x x   , 0dpdX  and they 
compete between them with the aim of maximising its profit defined as 
    
i
*
i i iP x TC x , p . 
We consider two alternative market structures, with simultaneous (Cournot) and 
sequential (Stackelberg) decisions respectively. Both structures are analysed separately in 
the following subsections. 
                                                 
4 The second order condition is always fulfilled due to the convexity of Ci in emissions. Throughout the 
paper, we restrict to interior solutions. Asterisks denote equilibrium values. 
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2.1 Cournot Model 
Consider first a Cournot framework, in which each firm decides its output level to 
maximise its profit taking the rival's output as given. Firm i's first order condition is 
  0ii i i
i
TCPP x x x
X x
     ,      (6) 
where " i " refers to the firm other than i . This equation implicitly defines the reaction 
function of firm i : 
 , Ri i ix x x p .      (7) 
 Using the implicit function theorem, we conclude that one firm´s output is 
decreasing in its rival´s output and the price of permits: 
2
2 2
2 2
0     0
2 2
iR R
i i
i ii
i i
TCdPx x x pdX
TC TCx pdP dP
dX dXx x

          
.   (8) 
The system of equations formed by both reaction functions determine the final 
equilibrium as a function of the permit price and using the equilibrium value of output we 
can also write both agents´ profits as a function of the permit price: 
     * * * * * *: ,i i i i i ip P x x x TC x e    .     (9) 
 Our main research question is to what extent, and by which channels, the scarcity 
of permits can benefit firms. Taking the price of permits as an indicator of scarcity, our 
question can be stated in an operational way by measuring what is the impact of a permit 
price increase on profits. Differentiating (9) with respect to p and taking into account 
equations (4) and (6) we obtain 

* *
* *
G
i
x
i
i i
i i i
SR
SR
d xdP x S e
p X p
     
,     (10) 
 10
from which we conclude that the marginal effect of the permit price on the profit can be  
split in three components. The two first effects ( xSR  and GSR ) are positive and account 
for the scarcity rents for firm i . The third component is negative and determines what 
part of the scarcity rents each firm can capture.  
The first component of scarcity rents is endogenous and represents the additional 
revenue that each firm will receive thanks to the reduction in output supply and the 
resulting increase in the output price. We call it “output scarcity rent”.  The second 
component is purely exogenous and simply equals the amount of permits that each firm 
receives for free. We label this term as “grandfathering scarcity rent” and corresponds to 
what is commonly known as windfall profit. 
The output scarcity rent is given by 
*
*x i
i i
xdPSR x
X p
   .     (10’) 
 It is interesting to note that a higher value of p  causes the output of both firms, 
and hence total output, to decrease, which pushes the price up, but each firm can only 
benefit from the part of this effect that is due to its rival’s output reduction ( * ix p  in 
equation (10’)). The reason is that decreasing the own output has a positive effect 
(increasing the price and decreasing the cost) and a negative effect (decreasing the 
number of sold units) and in equilibrium both effects cancel out each other because of the 
first order maximum profit conditions. The reduction in the rival’s production, on the 
contrary, causes output price to rise without having any negative side-effect for firm i . 
From (10’) we immediately obtain * *
2 1
1 2 , ,
x x
x p x p
SR SR     , where ,A B  denotes the 
elasticity of A  with respect to B , i.e., a firm can enjoy more output scarcity rent than its 
rival if its rival’s output is more sensitive to the permit price than its own output. 
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A consequence of this result is that a monopoly would never obtain positive 
output scarcity rents because of an increase in the permit price. The only channel by 
which a monopoly could benefit from a higher value of p  is the grandfathering scarcity 
rent and equation (10) implies that the monopoly profit could increase because of such an 
effect only if *i iS e , i.e., if it is a net seller of permits. 
The last term in (10) is the equilibrium amount of emissions, i.e., the required 
amount of permits for firm i , which determines the part of the scarcity rents that firm i  
is not able to capture. Who gets that part of the rents depends on how the firm obtains the 
permits. If they are auctioned, it is the auctioneer (typically the environmental authority) 
who gets the rents. If they are bought in the secondary market, the rents are transferred to 
the seller.  
Altogether, the second and third summands in (10) represent the net purchase (if 
*
i iS e ) or sell ( *i iS e ) of permits by firm i . If *i iS e , firm i  initially receives more 
permits than needed in equilibrium and then it would get an extra profit by selling some 
permits in the market, which can be most naturally interpreted as an scarcity rent since 
the firm is getting some revenue by selling a scarce asset. If  *i iS e  the firm is a net 
buyer of permits and the combination of the second term and third terms in (10) 
determines the cost increase due to a higher permit price. Even in this case we continue 
to interpret iS  as an scarcity rent in the sense that it allows the firm to finance for free 
part of the external cost caused by its own emissions. In the limiting case, *i iS e , all the 
equilibrium emissions are exactly covered with free permits. Then, an increase in the 
price of permits would not have any effect on the firm’s cost and the final effect is simply 
the output scarcity rent.  
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 If *i iS e  we know for sure that firm i ie S  would benefit from an increase in p , 
i.e., the scarcity rents would be large enough to overcompensate the additional cost. On 
the other hand, if *i iS e , in general we cannot tell which effect prevails at this level of 
generality. Anyway, it's interesting to note that, since the final effect is strictly positive 
when *i ie S , by continuity we can assert that there is some interval of iS  such that firm 
i 's profit increases with p  even if the firm is a net buyer of permits. Recall that this 
event is discarded in monopoly as the output scarcity rent is absent. 
 
2.2 Stackelberg model 
We now consider a setting in which there are a leader (firm 1) and a follower 
(firm 2) in the output market. The interest of this variation is to find out how different 
positions in the market, as a leader or a follower, determine the ability of a firm to 
capture scarcity rents. The FOC of the follower’s problem is 
*
2
2
2
0TCdPP x
dX x
   ,     (11) 
which, solving for 2x , gives the reaction function  2 1Rx x , p . Differentiating (11) and 
operating, we conclude that the optimal follower’s output is decreasing in the leader’s 
output and the permit price: 
2
2 *
21
2
2
0
2
R
dP
x dX
TCdPx
dX x
    
,  
2 *
2
2 2
2 *
2
2
2
0
2
R
TC
x x p
TCdPp
dX x

     
.   (12) 
The leader’s FOC is 
  2 11 2 1
1 1
1 0
Rx TCdPP x x x
dX x x
         
,     (13) 
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from which we obtain the leader’s optimal output as a function of the permit price, 
 *1x p . By differentiating (13), we conclude that the leader’s output supply is also 
decreasing in p : 
1
1
2 *
*
1 1
2 *
2
2
1 1
0
2
R
TC
dx x p
TCdp xdP
dX x x

       
.      (14) 
 Equations (12) and (14) show how the leader and the follower react to a permit 
price increase. While the follower only takes into account the effect of its own output 
variation on the output price, the leader incorporates, not only its own, but also the 
follower’s. This tends to make the denominator of (14) smaller in absolute value and, 
hence, the whole expression greater in absolute value, i.e., the leader’s output tend to be 
more sensitive to the permit price than the follower’s. 
Using the equilibrium output values we can express the profit of both firms solely 
as a function of the permit price. By direct differentiation with respect to p , and 
dropping the terms that cancel out due to the FOCs, we obtain 

1
1
1
*
* *2
1 1 1
G
x
R
SR
SR
d xdP x S e
dp dX p
   
,       (15) 

2
2
2
* *
* *1
2 2 2
G
x
SR
SR
d dxdP x S e
dp dX dp
   

.       (16) 
where we find again the same qualitative effects as in the Cournot model: two 
components of the scarcity rents, xSR  and SSR , together with the marginal cost effect 
due to the higher cost of permit purchase and the resulting sign is undetermined. 
Regarding the output scarcity rent, note that the effect of a price increase on the 
follower’s output has two components: a direct one and an indirect one through the 
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leader’s output. Formally, 
* *
2 2 2 1
1
R Rdx x x dx
dp p x dp
    . Nevertheless, the latter effect is already 
accounted for in the leader’s optimising process and hence only the former matters to 
determine the leader’s scarcity rent. 
Direct comparison of (15) and (16) shows that *
2 1
1 2 , ,R
x x
x p x p
SR SR     , i.e., the 
relative size of the output scarcity rent depends again on the relative elasticities, with the 
difference that what matters for the leader is the elasticity of its equilibrium output 
whereas for the follower it is the elasticity of its reaction function. The rest of the 
discussion presented in the Cournot case largely applies to the Stackelberg model. 
The main conclusion that we can draw from (15) and (16) is that, unlike the 
Cournot case, the conditions under which a price increase is profit-enhancing are 
different for the leader and the follower and this is due, not only to the fact that they may 
have different cost structures, but also to the fact that their reactions to a price increase, 
given in (12) and (14), are different and, therefore, it may be the case that an increase in 
the permit price causes the profit of one firm to increase and the profit of the other firm 
to decrease. To gain more accurate insights, we explore a specific case in the next 
section. 
 
3. A Separable Function   
 
3.1. Basic elements 
Assume that production and abatement costs are separable in the following way. 
The production cost of firm i  is given by icx , so there is a constant marginal production 
cost equal to c . The inverse demand function for output is linear:  P X a bX  . Each 
unit of output generates r  units of pollution, where 0r   is a constant coefficient of 
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pollution intensity (the gross emissions of firm i  are hence given by irx ). By 
undertaking abatement activities, firms can reduce their flow of pollution. Let us denote 
as 0iq   the amount of emissions abated by firm i . Thus, net emissions are given by 
i i ie rx q  . Following Sartzetakis (1997), we assume the following quadratic abatement 
cost function ( AC ), which is common to both firms: 
   i i iAC q q d tq  ,      (17) 
where d  and t  are positive parameters. Assume that both firms initially receive an equal 
allocation of free permits, 1 2S S S  , and denote as iy  the amount of permits that firm 
i  buys (if 0iy  ) or sells (if 0iy  ) in the market, which can be calculated as the 
difference between net emissions and the initial allocation: 
i i i iy e S rx q S     .      (18) 
In other words, i ie y S  ; i.e., the net emissions of a firm must be covered by 
permits that either come from its free allocation or are bought at the market. Firm i ’s 
total cost function is now given by 
      ,i i i i i i i i iTC x y cx rx y S d t rx y S py        ,    (19) 
which, following the notation used above, can be written in terms of output and net 
emissions as 
        ,i i i i i i i i iTC x e cx rx e d t rx e p e S       .    (20) 
Solving the third stage of the game, we can compute the optimal amount of 
emissions of firm i  as a function of output: 
 * ,
2i i i
p de x p rx
t
  , 1, 2,i       (21) 
and hence firm i ’s optimal abatement is  
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 *
2i
p dq p
t
 , 1, 2,i       (22) 
which, due to separability, is independent of output and, due to cost symmetry, is 
common for both firms. Using (21) in (18) and (20) we obtain the optimal traded permits 
and the corresponding minimised cost function: 
 * ,
2i i i
d py x p rx S
t
   ,      (23) 
     
2
* ,
4i i i
p d
TC x p x c pr pS
t
    ,     (24) 
and the latter expression reveals that the marginal production cost is constant in output 
and increasing in the permit price. The market value of the grandfathered permits plays 
the role of a lump-sum cost reduction. Now we move on to the output stage considering 
separately the Cournot and the Stackelberg cases. 
 
3.2 Cournot 
First, we consider the Cournot model. To ensure interior solution (with output, 
emissions and abatement being non-negative), we introduce the following assumption. 
Assumption 1. The price of permits is bounded in the following way: Cd p p   where 
 
2
2 3
2 3
C tr a c bdp :
tr b
   . 
The lower bound for p  introduced in Assumption 1 prevents abatement from 
being negative (see (22)). Note that d  is the marginal cost of abatement at 0q  . If the 
price of permits is even lower than the cost of the first unit of abatement, it will never be 
profitable to abate, since buying permits is always a cheaper option. The upper bound for 
p  prevents emissions from being negative, which implies that output is also positive.5 
                                                 
5 If net emissions and abatement are nonnegative, gross emissions must also be nonnegative, i.e., 0irx  , 
which implies 0ix  . 
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From the FOCs of the firms we obtain their reaction functions and the equilibrium 
output level, which is common for both firms: 
* *
3i i
a c rpx x
b
   .       (25) 
 As in the classical Cournot model with linear demand and constant marginal cost, 
the output of both firms depend positively on the demand intercept, a , and negatively on 
the demand slope, b , and all the cost parameters c , r  and p . The equilibrium profits 
are also constant across firms and can be computed as    * * * * *2 ,i i i i ia bx x TC x p    . 
To determine the effect of a permit price increase, we differentiate to get 
 
  
*
*
*
3 2G
i
x
i i
i
i
i i
SR
SR q
p r p dx S rx
p t
e
          
,     (26) 
which is the particular version of (10) in this example. The first term in (26) is the output 
scarcity rent, the second is the grandfathering scarcity rent and the third (the whole 
parenthesis) is the cost effect (determined by net emissions). We can get some useful 
intuitions by simple inspection of expression (26). 
First, by assigning a large enough amount of free permits, S , it's always possible 
to make a firm willing that the permit price increases thanks to the grandfathering 
scarcity rent. In simple words, any firm would benefit if it could hold a large amount of 
an asset (permits) that is becoming scarcer (and thus more expensive) in the market. 
Assume now that the grandfathering effect is eliminated by setting 0S   in (26) 
(consider, as a particularly relevant example, that the permits are sold in an auction 
instead of grandfathering). There are still two positive effects, the combination of which 
may cause the firm to benefit from an increase in the permit price. The first is the output 
scarcity rent and the second is due to the adaptation ability of the firm by means of 
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abatement (the second term in the parenthesis). If there was not an available abatement 
technology or it was prohibitory expensive,6 then the right-hand side of (26) would 
collapse to  2 3 ir x , whose sign is unambiguously negative. The economic 
consequence of this result is that the output scarcity rent by itself would never be enough 
to fully compensate the cost effect of a higher permit price. 
To get some additional insight, we can use the equilibrium values of output and 
emissions to write the profit function in terms of the permit price: 
     
2 2
*
9 4i
a c pr p d
p pS
b t
      .    (27) 
The main features of this function and their economic consequences are 
summarised in Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1,  *i p  is a strictly convex function of p  with a 
global minimum at ˆ Cp , with ˆ C Cd p p  . Therefore,  *i p  is decreasing for ˆ Cp p  
and increasing for ˆ Cp p    
According to Proposition 1, the profit function of both firms is U-shaped and, 
therefore, there is a positive critical value of the permit price, ˆ Cp ,7 below which the 
negative effect dominates, i.e., a marginal increase of the permit price will reduce the 
firms’ profit, whereas above it further increments of the price will generate more than 
enough scarcity rents to offset the negative effect and make the firms better off. 
To understand the shape of this functions it's instructive to investigate the 
behaviour of each component of (26) with respect to p . According to (25), output is 
decreasing in p  and thus the size of the output scarcity rent is decreasing in p  while the 
                                                 
6 This can be seen by making t  arbitrarily large in (26). 
7 Specifically,
   
2
4 9 2
ˆ
4 9
C tr a c b d tSp
tr b
    . 
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grandfathering scarcity rent is constant in p . Combining (21) and (25) it can be shown 
that the cost effect (determined by *ie ) is a decreasing function of p . This is due to the 
ability of the firm to adapt by a reducing output (and emissions) and increasing 
abatement. It turns out that the latter effect dominates the former, which gives the profit 
function a convex shape as stated in Proposition 1. 
 
3.3 Stackelberg 
Assume that firms 1 and 2  are a leader and a follower respectively. In this case, 
we need to impose Assumption 2 to ensure interior solution. 
Assumption 2. The price of permits is bounded in the following way: Sd p p   where 
 
2
2
2
S bd rt a cp :
b tr
   .      (28) 
As above, this assumption prevents abatement, emissions (and hence output) from 
being negative.8 By standard methods,9 we obtain the equilibrium outputs: 
*
1 2
a c rpx
b
  ,      (29) 
*
2 4
a c rpx
b
  .      (30) 
 From (29) and (30), we conclude that the leader’s output is twice that of the 
follower. Using these expressions we obtain the equilibrium profits as a function of p  
and, by differentiation, the effect of the permit price on equilibrium profits can be 
measured as 
                                                 
8 In this case the upper bound is set at the point at which the emissions of the follower become zero, which 
implies that the rest of relevant variables are non-negative. 
9 The follower chooses 2x  to maximise its profit while taking 1x  as given. The leader chooses 1x  to 
maximise its own profit taking into account the follower’s reaction function. 
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 
*
*
* *
2 2
i
G
i
x
i
i
i i
SR
SR e
r p dx S rx
dp t

       
,    (31) 
which looks very similar to (26) and qualitatively the same effects are present. The 
grandfathering scarcity rent and the abatement effect are identical as in the Cournot 
model. Once again, the output scarcity rent by itself cannot compensate for the cost effect 
due to a higher permit price. Also, the positive abatement effect is increasing in p , and 
so the higher the permit price the more the firms can benefit by doing abatement to adapt 
themselves to the market conditions. 
 As a difference from the Cournot case, the output scarcity rent that accrue to each 
firm represents a larger proportion of its own output ( 2r  instead of 3r ).  Another 
difference is due to the fact that the leader produces twice as much as the follower, and 
thus, it enjoys more output scarcity rents, but its gross emissions are also bigger than the 
follower's. Simple manipulation of (31), together with (29) (30), gives 
   1 2* * * *1 2 02 8r a c rpr x xdp dp b          ,   (32) 
where the inequality always holds under interior solution. Therefore, a rise in the permit 
price will always benefit more (or harm less) the follower than the leader. The reason lies 
in the output difference: since the leader produces more than the follower, it also pollutes 
more and its cost is more sensitive to the permit price. The impact of p  on both firms’ 
profit is summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.  *1 p  and  *2 p  are strictly convex functions of p  with a global  
minimum at 1ˆ
Sp  and 2ˆ
Sp  respectively, with 2 1ˆ ˆ
S Sd p p    
 According to Proposition 2, the minima of the profit functions are ordered such 
that 2 1ˆ ˆp p ; i.e., the follower reaches a minimum for a lower price than the leader. 
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Hence, we have that, if 2ˆp p , both firms are situated in the decreasing part of their 
profit functions (and so would prefer that the price decreases). If, instead, 2 1ˆ ˆp p p  , 
the follower is situated in the increasing part (and so will benefit from a price increase), 
whereas the leader is still in the decreasing part (and therefore will still prefer the price to 
decrease). 
 So, from the point of view of our research, one important novelty of the 
Stackelberg model with respect to Cournot is the fact that both firms can have different 
interests regarding the evolution of p . As we discussed in the next section, this has 
important implications for the chances of collusive behaviour. 
 
4. Scarcity rents and price manipulation 
In this section we explore the question of how the existence of scarcity rents can 
generate incentives for the firms to lobby or collude in order to manipulate the price of 
permits upwards. As it was discussed in the introduction, some authors have claimed that 
this is a plausible possibility and there is some empirical evidence to suggest that it has 
happened in the past. As in Ehrhart et al. (2008), we do not explicitly model the permit 
market. Consequently, we restrict ourselves to testing the existence of incentives for 
collusion to manipulate the price of permits rather than modelling price manipulation 
itself or determining if such manipulation has taken place in practice. 
In our framework, it is natural to consider that both firms have incentives to 
collude in order to manipulate the price upwards when the profit of both is increasing in 
p  simultaneously. To get sharper results about this question, we focus on the separable 
case introduced in Section 3, although the qualitative insights we obtain can be extended 
to a more general setting. We have shown that, both in the Cournot and the Stackelberg 
cases, for each specific firm there is a threshold below which the firm prefers the permit 
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price to decrease and above which it prefers an increase. The comparison of these 
thresholds is crucial to determine the generation of incentives for collusive agreements. 
 
4.1 Cournot vs. Stackelberg 
In the Cournot model, according to Proposition 1, the threshold value is ˆ Cp , 
which splits the range of possible values for p  into two non-empty regions, that we call 
C-I:= ˆ[ , )Cd p  and C-II:= ˆ( , ]C Cp p . As a function of p , the profit of both firms is 
decreasing in the first region and increasing in the second. Therefore, the incentives for 
firms to collude in order to push the price up exist in region C-II and not in C-I. 
Things are a somewhat different in the Stackelberg case. From Proposition 2, we 
know 2 1ˆ ˆ
S Sp p , which means that the follower reaches the threshold value sooner (i.e., 
for a lower value of p ) than the leader. As it is shown in Figure 1, this can give rise to 
three different regions. In region S-I:= 2ˆ[ , )
Sd p , the profit of both firms is decreasing in 
p . In region S-II:= 2 1ˆ ˆ( , )
S Sp p , the profit of the leader is still decreasing while the 
follower’s is increasing. Finally, in region S-III:= 1 1ˆ( , ]
S Sp p  the profit of both firms is 
increasing in p . It is only in region S-III that both firms have incentives to collude in 
order to push the price upwards. Proposition 3 compares the relevant thresholds for both 
models. 
 
Proposition 3. The critical values of the permit price in the Cournot and the Stackelberg 
model are ordered in the following way: 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
S C S F Cp p p p p      
According to Proposition 3, 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
S C Sp p p  , which means that a Cournot firm 
reaches the threshold value later than a Stackelberg follower but sooner than a 
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Stackelberg leader. Moreover, the last three inequalities in Proposition 3 imply that 
region S-III is strictly contained in region C-II, which means that collusion for price 
inflation is more likely under Cournot than under Stackelberg competition, in the sense 
that there is a wider range compatible with such an event. So, one key conclusion of our 
study is that the existence of a leader-follower relationship between the firms reduces the 
chances of collusive behaviour with respect to a symmetric setting such as the Cournot 
framework. 
 *1 p
 *2 p
d
i
p
Reg. S‐I
1pˆ2pˆ
Reg. S‐II Reg. S‐III
p
 
FIGURE 1: Equilibrium profits as a function of p in the Stackelberg model 
 
The focus of this paper is on region S-III, as this is the only one within which 
firms can find it profitable to collude in order to push the price up. One natural question 
is how large this region is, or, in other words, how likely it is to fall within this region. 
Region S-III is delimited by two threshold values for p . First, 1ˆ
Sp , which is the price 
above which it is profitable, not only for the follower, but also for the leader to push the 
price up. The second threshold is the upper bound, Sp , which is the highest value of the 
price compatible with an interior solution. The size of region III is thus given by the 
difference between these two thresholds, which can be computed as 
1 2
4ˆ
2
S S btSp p
b tr
   ,      (33) 
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and so the size of region S-III depends positively on the number of free permits received 
by the firms, as well as the slope of the demand curve, b , and the abatement cost 
parameter t , whereas it depends negatively on the emissions intensity parameter, r . In 
the next subsection we focus on the role of grandfathering. 
 
4.2 The role of grandfathering 
In this section we ask about the effect of modifying the initial allocation of 
permits on the generation of incentives for collusion. For convenience, define the 
following threshold: 
 2:
9
C r a c drS
b
  . 
Proposition 4. In the Cournot model, under Assumption 1, the following results hold: 
a) As S  increases, ˆ Cp  decreases, which implies that the size of region C-I 
decreases and that of region C-II increases.  
b) For any value CS S  , region C-I disappears. 
c) The size of region C-II is strictly positive for 0S     
Proposition 4 shows that increasing the number of free permits, S , shifts the 
lower bound of region C-II to the left while the upper bound price remains the same. 
Therefore, region C-I shrinks and region C-II gets bigger, which implies that the chances 
for collusive behaviour increase. Moreover, Proposition 4 shows that region C-I 
disappears if S  is large enough. The main consequence is that the more free permits the 
firms own, the more likely they are to be willing that the permit price increases. The 
reason is that the existence of free permits makes permit purchasing less costly. 
Moreover, if S  is large enough it opens the way for obtaining positive revenues by 
selling some permits. Nevertheless, result c) in the proposition implies that, even without 
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grandfathering, there is a positive range such that both firms prefer the permit price to 
increase and thus they have incentives to lobby it up. 
We now perform a similar exercise for the Stackelberg case. Define the following 
threshold value for S : 
 :
8
S r a c drS
b
  .     (34) 
Lemma 1. In the Stackelberg model, under Assumption 2, the following results hold: 
a) If 0 S S   , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sd p p p   . 
b) If 2S S S   , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sp d p p   . 
c) If 2S S  , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sp p d p     
d) If 0S  ,  then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sd p p p     
Proposition 5. In the Stackelberg model, under Assumption 2, the following results hold: 
a) If 0 SS S   , regions S-I, S-II and S-III are non-empty.  
b) If 2S SS S S   , region I disappears and region II is delimited by 1ˆ Sd p p  . 
c) If 2 SS S  , regions I and II disappear and region III is defined by the entire 
feasible range, [ , ]Sd p   
d) If 0S  , region S-III disappears  
 The consequences of Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 are the following. The threshold 
values 1ˆ
Sp  and 2ˆ
Sp  decrease with S , which implies that, for each firm, there is a wider 
range such that its profit is increasing in p . This renders a similar conclusion as in the 
Cournot model: the changes of observing collusive behaviour increase with 
grandfathering. If the initial allocation is large enough, region I disappears, which implies 
that the follower is always interested in increasing p  and, if it is even larger, both 
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regions I and II disappear, which implies that both the leader and the follower are always 
interested in manipulating the price upward. This is the most favourable case for 
collusion. 
But there is a qualitative difference with respect to the Cournot model: if no 
permits are allocated for free, the chances of collusive behaviour shrink to the extent that 
they totally disappear because a price increase is never profitable for the leader although 
it can be for the follower. This result has an important policy implication. If the output 
market is characterised by Stackelberg competition and there is no grandfathering, the 
firms have not incentives to collude in order to manipulate and the inclusion of 
grandfathering opens up the possibility of collusion. 
 
4.3. Parameter asymmetries in the Stackelberg model 
In the previous subsections we have assumed both firms to be fully symmetric in 
terms of their cost functions and the initial allocation they receive. In the Cournot case, 
moreover, they are also symmetric regarding their role in the market. In the Stackelberg 
model, although they are symmetric in terms of the parameters there is an asymmetry in 
their role as one acts as a leader and the other as a follower. One central conclusion is 
that this asymmetry makes collusive agreements less likely as their interests are 
decoupled. 
 As a sensitivity analysis, in this subsection we consider the possibility that firms 
are asymmetric in terms of cost and/or initial permit endowment. In the Cournot case, 
since we start from a fully symmetric situation, it is rather straightforward to conclude 
that, in general, introducing any asymmetry between the firms will make their interests to 
diverge and the chances for collusive agreements will decrease. So, we focus on the 
Stackelberg case, in which the results are less obvious as we start from a situation that is 
already asymmetric in nature. 
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We denote the production cost of firm i  as i ic x , where ic  is a firm-specific unit 
cost parameter. Analogously, firm i’s abatement cost function is given by: 
   i i i i i iAC q q d t q  , 1, 2i  .   (35) 
Each firm receives an initial free endowment of permits, Si, which is not 
necessarily constant across firms. Proceeding as in the basic case, we obtain the optimal 
amounts of emissions, abatement and purchase of permits for each firm in the emissions 
stage:10 
 * ,
2
i
i i i
i
d pe x p rx
t
  ,    (36) 
       *
2
i
i
i
p dq p
t
 ,     (37) 
 * ,
2
i
i i i i
p dy x p rx S
t
   ,    (38) 
and, moving on to the output stage, we can compute the equilibrium levels of output: 
* 2 1
1
2
2
a c c rpx
b
   ,     (39) 
* 1 2
2
2 3
4
a c c rpx
b
   .    (40) 
To investigate the likelihood of observing collusive behaviour, we proceed by 
analysing the effect of different parameters on the size of region S-III. Due to the larger 
number of parameters, by choosing the right combination of them we could generate 
almost any imaginable case. Hence, we need to bound the range of possibilities so as to 
avoid meaningless results. For this reason, we introduce the following assumptions: 
                                                 
10 Unlike the other parameters, we assume that the emissions intensity parameter, r, is common to both 
firms; i.e., 1 2r r r  . There are two reasons for this simplification. First, the sensitivity analysis results 
related to these parameters are unclear and so we do not gain any valuable insight by exploring them. 
Second, the sign of some equilibrium values for some of the key variables are affected by the terms 1 22r r  
and/or 1 23 2r r  and this fact forces us to keep the asymmetry between these parameters bounded so as to 
avoid meaningless results. 
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Assumption 3: 21 2,
Sd d p p   ,   where 2Sp   is the value of p  such that *2 0e  . 
Assumption 4: * *1 2e e . 
Assumption 5: 2 1ˆ ˆ
S Sp p . 
The two first assumptions ensure nonnegative values for all the relevant variables. 
The idea is that the leader will still be the one who produces a larger amount of output 
and emissions. Hence, the follower will still be the one who finds it profitable to pollute 
zero for a lower value of p  and such a value determines the upper bound for the interval 
that is compatible with an interior solution, 2Sp   (where “ 2S  ” stands for “Stackelberg, 
case 2”). If this is the case, it is natural to accept that Assumption 5 also holds; i.e., it is 
easier for the follower than it is for the leader to benefit from a price increase. 
Under these assumptions, region S-III is still delimited by the leader’s critical 
price, call it 21ˆ
Sp  , and the upper bound 2Sp   and hence its size increases if 2Sp   
increases and/or 21ˆ
Sp   decreases. Proposition 3 summarises how the size of this region 
depends on the parameters of the model and Table 1 presents a taxonomy of all the 
relevant effects. 
Proposition 6. In the Stackelberg case, under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the size of region 
S-III increases in the following cases: 
a) If the leader’s marginal production cost, 1c , increases or the follower’s marginal 
production cost, 2c , decreases. 
b) If the parameter of the linear term in the abatement cost function decreases for the 
leader ( 1d ) or increases for the follower ( 2d ).  
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c) If the parameter of the quadratic term in the leader’s abatement cost function, 1t , 
decreases (provided the number of free permits is moderate) or the equivalent follower’s 
parameter, 2t , increases.  
d) If the number of free permits received by the leader, 1S , is increasing regardless of the 
free permits received by the follower  
Effects on 
thresholds 
Changes in model parameters  
c1 c2 d1 d2 t1 t2 S1 S2 
2Sp   + - 0 + 0 + 0 0 
2
1ˆ
Sp   - + + 0 + (*) 0 - 0 
 2 21ˆS Sp p    + - - + - (*) + + 0 
Table 1. Summary of sensitivity analysis results. 
                             (*) For a moderate value of S1. 
 
Increasing the leader’s production cost or reducing the follower’s cost tends to 
erode the leader’s advantage with respect to the follower in the output market, which has 
the effect of making the firms more symmetric in a certain sense. The more symmetric 
the firms are, the more aligned their interests will be and hence it is more likely for them 
to find it profitable to collude. Increasing 1c  has a twofold effect. On the one hand, 
Sp  
grows because the output of the follower increases, which makes it less likely for firm 2 
to decide not to emit at all (in other words, the range of prices under which there is an 
interior solution widens). On the other hand, 1ˆ
Sp  decreases, as, due to the higher cost, 
firm 1 tends to produce less and to emit less and hence its total cost will be less sensitive 
to an increase in the price of permits. Both of these effects tend to enlarge the collusive 
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region. Just the opposite occurs when 2c  increases. Firm 1 tends to produce more and 
pollute more and hence its cost becomes more sensitive to an increase in the price of 
permits (which increases the value of 1ˆ
Sp ), whereas the follower tends to produce less 
and to reach the point where it finds it profitable to stop polluting sooner ( Sp  decreases), 
which reduces the size of the collusion region. 
The abatement cost parameters ( id  and it ) are only relevant for the own firm, but 
not for its rival. Both 2d  and 2t  are irrelevant in determining the value of 1ˆ
Sp . However, 
increasing either of them enlarges the relevant feasible range because the follower’s 
abatement cost increase, which makes it less likely to reach the point where it pollutes 
zero. The corresponding parameters for firm 1 are immaterial in determining the value of 
Sp , their only relevant effect being on 1pˆ . Assuming a moderate value of the leader’s 
initial endowment of permits, any increase in 1d  and 1t  makes the leader’s abatement 
cost higher, which makes firm 1 become more sensitive to increases in the price of 
permits. 
Finally, the initial allocation of permits is irrelevant for the upper bound Sp , as it 
represents simply a fixed term in the cost (and the profit) function and so the optimal 
decisions are not affected. The value of a firm’s profits is affected by its own endowment 
(not the rival’s) and hence only 1S  is relevant in determining the size of region S-III. 
When the leader’s free endowment increases, its cost becomes less sensitive to an 
increase in the price of permits and it will hence be more receptive to the idea of pushing 
the price up, thereby increasing the likelihood of observing collusive behaviour. 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
We have studied the creation of scarcity rents for oligopolistic firms due to the 
requirement to buy emission permits in a cap-and-trade system. Along with a higher 
purchase cost, a permit price increase can generate scarcity rents in two ways: firstly, by 
restricting output and pushing up its price, and secondly, when the firms are endowed 
with an initial permit allocation, a higher permit price makes such an allocation more 
valuable. We claim that these scarcity rents can generate incentives for the firms to 
collude in order to inflate the permit price. 
We have demonstrated that the extent to which so-called output scarcity rents can 
be obtained by a specific firm increases with the elasticity of its rival's output to the 
permit price as the effect of own output variation cannot be profitable in equilibrium. 
A leadership position tends, ceteris paribus, to make a firm produce more, so its 
cost becomes more sensitive to a permit price increase. As a consequence, a leader is less 
prone to be willing to face a higher price and thus to accept taking part in a price-
inflation collusive agreement. In short, a leader-follower relationship in the output market 
reduces the scope for collusion to manipulate the price of permits upward. In a specific 
example we have shown that the region within which there are incentives to collude can 
shrink to such an extent that it can disappear. A policy implication of this finding is that, 
when there is a leader in the product market, this can result in a lack of incentives for 
collusion in the permit market. 
Another policy implication is that distributing some permits for free by means of 
grandfathering allows firms to obtain larger scarcity rents and strengthens the incentives 
to collude in order to manipulate permit prices up. In the case of Stackelberg competition 
this effect may be particularly important as the existence of grandfathering is actually a 
necessary condition for any profitable collusive agreement to take place. The greater the 
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number of permits distributed by a non-market scheme (particularly to firms that enjoy 
market power) the more incentives there are for collusion. The European Union is 
reducing the use of grandfathering and increasing the use of auctioning to distribute 
emission permits. The 2008 revised European Emission Trading Directive established the 
mandate that auctioning is to be the default method for allocating allowances as a 
fundamental change for the third trading period, starting in 2013. The arguments put 
forward by the European Commission (EC) to support the introduction of auctions are 
that auctioning “best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system, 
creates the greatest incentives for investment in a low-carbon economy and eliminates 
windfall profits”.11 Our results provide an additional argument to reduce the use of 
grandfathering (and arguably to increase the use of auctioning), as it might introduce 
incentives for price manipulation. 
Our final insight is that the likelihood of firms finding collusion profitable is very 
sensitive to the cost asymmetries between them. In general terms, the more asymmetric 
the firms are, the more difficult collusion becomes. Moreover, if a grandfathering scheme 
exists, the more permits are allocated to firms enjoying market power, the more likely it 
is that collusion takes place. 
 
 
                                                 
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/faq_en.htm, section “Why are allowances being 
auctioned?”. Alvarez and André (2014) present a discussion on the efficiency argument. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The equilibrium value for emissions can be obtained from equations (21) and 
(25). Equating this value to zero we conclude that emissions are positive under 
Assumption 1: 
     *
2
2 3 2 3
0 :
6 3 2
C
i
tr a c rp b p d tr a c bd
e p p
bt b tr
             (A.1) 
Using equations (24) and (25) together with the inverse demand function yields 
the following expression for the equilibrium profit: 
     
2 2
* 4 9 36
36i
t a c rp b p d bptS
p
bt
      , 
which is strictly convex in p  because the second derivative is positive. From the first 
derivative we get the critical price 
 *
2
4 9 18
ˆ0 :
9 4
Ci rt a c bd btSp p
p b r t
        .    (A.2) 
By direct comparison , we conclude 
                            
   
  
2
2 2
6 18 3 2
ˆ 0
3 2 9 4
C C
brt a c dr btS b r t
p p
b r t b r t
       ,  (A.3) 
which is positive under Assumption 1 because all the parenthesis are positive. To prove 
that  a c dr   is positive, using (22) and the definition of abatement ( i i iq rx e  ), we 
conclude that, within the relevant range, 
*
* 0ii
ex
r
  . Using the expression for *ix  given 
in (25), we conclude that 0ix   implies a c rp  , and that this inequality, together with 
d p  (Assumption 1), implies .a c dr        QED. 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
Using (29) and (30) in (21), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions: 
   2*
1 2
db rt a c p b tr
e
bt
    ,     (A4) 
   2*
2
2 2
4
bd tr a c p b tr
e
bt
    ,     (A5) 
By direct comparison we conclude that under Assumption 2, equilibrium 
emissions are nonnegative, 
 * *
2 2 2
2
0 :
2
S bd rt a ce e p p
b tr
       .     (A6) 
and following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, output must also be 
nonnegative.  Using the equilibrium values of output and emissions, together with the 
expression of the inverse demand and the cost function (20) we obtain the equilibrium 
profits of both firms: 
          
         
         
2 2
* * * * * *
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2
* * * * * *
2 1 2 2 2 2
2 8
, ,
8
4 16
, .
16
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
        
        
 
The second derivative reveals that these functions are strictly convex. 
Differentiating them with respect to p, we conclude that they have respective minima at 
   
   
*
1 1 2
*
2 2 2
2 4
ˆmin ,
2
4 8
ˆmin ,
4
S
p
S
p
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
     
     
 
and it follows straightforwardly that both 1ˆ
Sp  and 2ˆ
Sp  depend negatively on S . 
Regarding the order of the thresholds, by direct comparison we conclude that 
 1 2ˆ ˆ 2 2 0S Sp p brt a c dr rSt      ; however, we have already proved 0a c dr    
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in Proposition 1, which ensures that 1 2ˆ ˆ
S Sp p . Moreover, using (A6) we also conclude 
that 1 12
4ˆ ˆ
2
S S SbtSp p p
b tr
   . Hence, we have that 2 1ˆ ˆ
S S Sp p p  .   QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove the proposition it is enough to compare the corresponding expressions, 
compute the difference and check the sign. 
 
  
2 2
1 2 2
2
ˆ ˆ 0
2 9 4
S C brt a c dr br t Sp p
b r t b r t
      , 
 
  
2 2
2 2 2
7 14
ˆ ˆ 0
9 4 4
C S brt a c dr br t Sp p
b r t b r t
      , 
 
  2 2 03 2 2C S
rbt a c dr
p p
b r t b r t
     .         QED 
            
Proof of Proposition 4 
The first part of the proposition results from deriving the expression for ˆ Cp  given 
in (A.2) with respect to S . To prove the second part note that Region I disappears when 
ˆ Cd p , and using the expression for ˆ Cp : 
   
2
4 9 18 2
ˆ :
9 4 9
C rt a c bd btS r a c drp d d S S
b r t b
         
 . 
The third part follows immediately from (A.3).    QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
From Proposition 2 we know 2 1ˆ ˆ
S S Sp p p  . To determine the relative position of 
d , first note that Assumption 2 implies Sd p  and hence we only have to check 
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whether d  is below 2ˆ
Sp , in the interval  2 1ˆ ˆ,S Sp p  or in the interval  1ˆ ,S Sp p . By direct 
comparison, we conclude the following, which prove statements b) and c): 
 
1ˆ 24
S r a c drp d S S
b
      ,    (A7) 
 
2ˆ 8
S r a c rdp d S S
b
      ,    (A8) 
To prove statement d) note that 1ˆ
Sp p  when 0S  .   QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Statement a) follows from a similar reasoning to that used in the proof of 
Proposition 4. Statements b), c) and d) follow straightforwardly from the corresponding 
statements in Lemma 1.         QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Using (39) and (40) in (36), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions: 
     1 1 2 1* *1 1
1
2
,
2
b d p t r a c c rp
e x p
bt
     , 
     2 2 1 2* *2 2
2
2 2 3
,
4
b d p rt a c c rp
e x p
bt
     . 
 By imposing the non-negativity conditions on the follower’s emissions, we obtain 
the upper bound value for the permit price, 2Sp  : 
 2 2 2 1* 2
2 2
2
2 3 2
0 :
2
S bd rt a c ce p p
b r t
        .   (A9) 
By substitution of the relevant variables in the profit function, we obtain the 
expression for the leader’s profit function in terms of the model parameters:  
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     
2 2
2 1 1*
1 1
1
2
8 4
a c c rp p d
p pS
b t
        
Differentiating with respect to p , we obtain 
   * 1 1 1 1 2 11
1
2 4 2
4
b p d bt S rt a c c rp
p bt
        
and, by equating this derivative to zero, we get the minimum value of p  such that the 
leader finds it profitable to push the price up, 21ˆ Sp  : 
 * 1 2 1 1 1 1 21
12
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p r t b
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By direct differentiation of the values of 2Sp   and 21ˆ Sp  , we obtain the results in 
the proposition: 
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where, in an interior solution, the numerator of the last expression must be positive for 
the follower’s output to be positive.       QED. 
 
